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ABSTRACT 
THE MODERN APP PHENOMENON HAS 
SPREAD FAST AND WIDE WITH THE MAJOR 
SPREAD OF SMARTPHONES. THIS 
PHENOMENA IS NOW TREADING NEW 
GROUND, AND STARTS TO SURFACE IN 
OTHER MARKETS. WHILE THIS IS 
HAPPENING, THERE IS LIMITED RESEARCH 
DONE ON THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THESE 
APPS ON THE PLATFORM THEY INHABIT. 
LIKE THE PARASITES OF BIOLOGY THESE 
APPS COULD EVENTUALLY PROVE TO BE 
EITHER HARMFUL OR USEFUL FOR THE 
PLATFORM. THIS PAPER WILL LOOK AT 
SOME OF THE CHALLENGES FACING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF APPS AND OF THE 
PLATFORMS THEY INHABIT. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The in-vehicle infotainment(IVI) systems of 
modern cars are moving towards the rest of 
our mobile devices such as netbooks, tablets 
and smartphones in terms of functionality. A 
very clear example of this is the Android 
based platform recently released by Saab, 
called Saab IQon (Saab automobile, 2011). 
This platform includes the functionality 
found in any modern smartphone and even 
allows the customer to continually extend 
the functionality by downloading so called 
‘apps’ (small lightweight applications, that 
usually fulfill a single purpose). 
About a year ago, project MeeGo was 
launched (MeeGo 2010). It was a merge 
between two separate projects aimed at 
mobile platforms, Intel's Moblin and Nokia's 
Maemo. The new platform would also come 
to include a branch for in-vehicle devices, 
known as MeeGo IVI (Schroeder, 2010). 
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MeeGo is an open source project, running on 
a Linux kernel, which give developers and 
users good possibilities to configure it to 
their own preferences. 
A company in the automotive industry 
(CarComp) was interested in if MeeGo IVI 
has the capability to provide a secure and 
reliable platform for third party 
applications. An investigation of this new 
platform would have to consider many 
factors. Two of these, which are common 
concerns with any software supposed to run 
in a car, are security and reliability. As 
understood by the mere existence of Saab 
IQon and the now noticeable success of the 
app concept , (Sharma 2010) it is of course 
highly interesting to investigate the 
possibilities of letting a user run third-party 
software, which they can download from the 
internet, in their car. The concern of this 
paper is how third-party software can be 
developed for MeeGo IVI in respect to 
security and reliability concerns? The 
security and reliability became the main 
focus based on discussions we had with an 
engineer at CarComp. An example that 
usually was stated was that an app 
malfunctioning should not be able to disable 
the breaks on a running car. It’s from these 
discussions the concern for this paper was 
born. 
In our effort to answer this we used a 
methodology called design research. This 
will be thoroughly explained in the method 
section of this paper. The data we collected 
was both qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative data that was collected was 
chronically written descriptions of the 
implementation effort. The quantitative data 
that was collected was in the form of 
security and reliability requirements. The 
requirements was linked and traced in the 
development effort as well as the prototype 
artifact.  
The outcome of this research is in the form 
of a proof-of-concept app environment 
operating on the MeeGo IVI platform. The 
prototype should encompass all the security 
and reliability issues that will be presented 
in this thesis.  
Following this introductory section we will 
present our theoretical framework, the lens 
through which we look at our problem. 
Further, we will present the method used, 
the result of the research process and then 
discuss these findings under the light of our 
specified framework. Lastly, we sum the 
paper up in a concluding and discussing 
section.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The research in this thesis was done at the 
infotainment department at CarComp. 
CarComp is interested in the new IVI 
platform, MeeGo. The application we 
produced will help CarComp evaluate 
MeeGo as a viable platform for future IVI 
systems.  
CarComp is now facing questions 
concerning the security and reliability of the 
underlying system structure. How can an 
application execute in a safe environment, 
especially if it’s developed by third party 
developers? The area looked at in this thesis 
was framed from a security and reliability 
perspective. McGraw(2004) describes some 
examples of handling security, one of which 
is sandboxing, which would play a major 
part of the development effort. 
Saab has recently released an IVI system 
with the focus on letting third party 
developers develop applications for it. The 
idea for this thesis was to develop a secure 
application environment for third party 
developers.  The focus was on how to do this 
in a secure and reliable fashion. We have 
concluded that normal software security 
and stability requirements, such as 
Sommerville(2007) suggests authorization 
requirements, integrity requirements, 
intrusion detection requirements are not 
viable for this kind of system. The same goes 
for reliability requirements and metrics. 
This is because of the nature of the 
application, and the fact that it is intended 
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to run on a critical system. In the app 
environment that was produced, security 
and reliability were the main requirements.  
Desmet et al.(2007) describe five important 
architectural requirements for this kind of 
system (1) secure execution of third-party 
applications (2) support for the security-by-
contract paradigm (3) flexible integration of 
enforcement techniques (4) optimized for 
resource-restricted devices (5) 
compatibility with legacy applications. The 
first architectural requirement states that a 
software running should not be able break 
the underlying structure. The  second 
focused on security-by-contract, that 
security of the system can be based on 
contracts. The third states that on-device 
security enforcements should be flexible. 
The fourth is about the resource 
requirements needed. And finally the fifth 
states that the architecture should be able to 
work with legacy software. We will focus on 
the first, third and fourth. This is because of 
the focus of this thesis, namely security and 
reliability. These three architectural 
requirements were the ones that was best 
suited for the application. Secure execution 
of third-party applications is also identified 
as the primary requirement for this kind of 
system. This does not mean that the other 
architectural requirements will not be 
satisfied. As Desmet et al.(2007) explains, 
the architecture of the underlying structure 
must make sure that the application can’t 
jeopardize the reliability of the system it is 
run on. From this we extracted our two 
main focuses, security and reliability. We 
will use parts of the suggested architectural 
design for safe application execution that is 
suggested by  Desmet et al.(2007) in our 
development efforts.  The following two 
sections discuss the focus of the security 
and reliability concerns. 
SECURITY 
Every decision made in the development 
process was made from a security 
perspective. For the implementation 
process the security aspect would be 
evident in the following description: An 
application should not jeopardize the 
foundation system that it is run on, it should 
not be able to access data that is not 
intended for that application. The 
sandboxing plays a major role in the 
security aspect, as it will limit the execution 
of applications. 
RELIABILITY 
As with security the reliability aspect would 
color the entire development process, as 
well as the research process. When it comes 
to implementation process the following 
definition is used: if an application is badly 
written and crashes, the underlying 
structure should realize this and shut it 
down. Sandboxing would play a role in 
reliability, since applications run in the 
sandbox environment should not be able to 
halt the entire underlying structure. 
Sandboxing is a term used in computer 
science when an application is run in a 
closed off or simulated part of a system. 
Developers can usually create a sandboxed 
environment where an application cannot 
harm the underlying systems core 
functionality. This is done mainly to 
maintain reliability, but also for security, 
such as running untested or unsafe files 
(Prevelakis & Spinellis 2001). Sandboxing 
was one of the key areas that we explored. It 
was important to look at how sandboxing 
can contribute to software security and 
reliability.  
Important to keep in mind is the fact that a 
completely secure system most likely is a 
system turned off or completely 
disconnected from the world around it. 
Thus, our efforts cannot be seen as solutions 
to perfect security but rather attempts to 
enhance security where needed and 
possible. We have mainly been keeping the 
end users (device owner) and app vendors 
in mind as key stakeholders of security 
aspects. 
The implementation effort executed during 
our study attempted to shed light on issues 
related to the implementation of an app 
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environment. Studying how other platforms 
solved this issue, we set out to implement 
and investigate the feasibility of solutions 
for the MeeGo platform. A solution should 
add value of some kind (in our case security 
and reliability) to stakeholders of the 
system. Along with the development 
oriented parts of the investigation, we 
wanted to see how the actual system could 
be tweaked and used. Looking at how it has 
been done previously, the concept 
sandboxing seemed to be a reasonable place 
to start. 
We looked at different ways to solve the app 
environment problem for a critical system, 
we studied the way two of the major players 
in the app-market solve these issues. The 
two that we looked at are Android and 
iPhone (iOS). This is in an attempt to gather 
more information of how this problem has 
been solved before. Whether a mobile 
device such as a mobile phone is a critical 
system was not the focus of the study. 
THE THREE TIER MODEL 
This section will introduce a model that we 
call the ‘three tier model’ that was 
conceptualized during the development, it 
will be linked to requirements and show 
examples of how specific requirements 
were handled in the prototype artifact.  
The application of this model is supposed to 
be in the area of critical systems. The model 
will make sure that the underlying 
operating system will not be harmed in any 
way by the third party software that the 
user run. The model describes three tiers of 
security, the idea is to make sure that if one 
of the tiers break there will at least be 
another one that will make sure that the 
underlying system is not harmed. First we 
will introduce the thought behind this 
model, by shortly describing each tier and 
give some examples how it can be 
implemented. Later we will show how it was 
applied to our prototype artifact.  
The three tier model is comprised of three 
security levels. The first one is to set 
limitations on the development language of 
the apps, which means the specific language 
the apps are written in. We hypothesized 
that this would greatly enhance the security 
of the system, by constraining what the 
developer can do, but also force the 
developer to use specific purpose designed 
libraries.  
Second level is to have a controller that 
handles the different processes that the 
apps run in. This affected both of the 
identified requirements, security and 
reliability. The security requirement benefit 
from this by having each app run in a 
separate process, so all memory and data 
that is used would be local to that app. The 
reliability requirement will benefit from this 
because if the app process crashes or 
freezes it will not interrupt the underlying 
operating system. The controller will also 
monitor the app process for errors. The 
hypothesis behind this level is that each app 
needs something that controls it, making 
sure it’s not doing something it is not 
supposed to do. 
The third part is to have a safe place to run 
the app in, that is away from the basic 
functionality of the underlying operating 
system. We hypothesized that this fulfilled 
most of the reliability requirement, by 
closing off parts of the underlying operating 
system, so it can’t be modified in an 
undesirable way. 
A detailed explanation of each tier will 
follow, with examples of how that tier can 
be implemented. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
TIER 1: CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
LANGUAGE 
This tier focuses on the way that the apps 
are written and putting limitations on the 
specific language that is used. The idea 
behind this is to make sure that the author 
of an app can’t call functions that are 
potentially harmful to the system. There are 
many ways that this is achievable, either 
from the use of a scripting language for the 
app implementation, or by forcing the 
developer to use specific, purpose built 
libraries. The idea is not to limit the app 
developer, but give more of a rigid 
framework for development. Since this 
model is meant for critical systems, the idea 
of having an open platform is not 
recommended. Forcing the developer to use 
an API that has limited functionality is 
important for the security aspect of the 
system. Requirements that are addressed by 
this tier is security. This tier covers the 
flexible integration of enforcement 
techniques described by Desmet et 
al.(2007), by letting the developer of the 
system easily change the way that security 
is enforced on the app development 
language. Desmet et al.(2007) discusses 
different ways this can be achieved, one of 
the ways to let the app developers have 
more access is to enforce the use of 
signatures.  Where registered and trusted 
app developers can get a signature to 
distribute with their apps, that will allow 
the app to use functions that the general 
public cannot. This is one example of how 
such technique can be implemented in the 
model. Another example is enforcing the use 
of a specific API(application programming 
interface), this API can be formed to only let 
the app developer to use specific libraries 
when developing. This is more like the 
Android approach, where Java is used. Java 
is a general purpose programming language, 
but has a specific, purpose built 
programming API for Android development. 
A third example is to force the app 
developer to use a specific programming 
language, that is either built for the app 
development, or restricted for such use. 
This is more how iPhone have solved this 
problem, by not permitting development for 
their platform in other languages than C, 
C++ and Objective C. Any of these examples 
give a good solution to solving this tier. 
TIER 2: PROCESS CONTROL 
Even if the developers of the system can put 
limitations of how the apps are written, they 
cannot limit what the app actually do. This 
is why we felt the need for some sort of 
controlling mechanism. The idea behind this 
tier is to limit the execution of apps, and to 
monitor their behavior. If an app starts to 
use up too much resources, and starts 
slowing down the underlying system the 
controller should have the authority to shut 
the app down. The same goes for if an app 
crashes and becomes unresponsive. Not 
being able to control the underlying system 
could be considered an extreme reliability 
risk. So the main focus for this tier is the 
reliability of the system. An example of how 
this can be implemented is to have a 
program that spawns each app process and 
monitors them. This is a good solution, 
mainly because there is a separate process 
that keeps track of the spawned app 
processes. So as long as this process is not 
compromised the apps can’t do any harm on 
the system. The process controller could 
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also monitor its own process, and if it is 
compromised it will close itself down along 
with all the app processes. Another way of 
solving this tier is to use a native operating 
system constraint on processes. For a 
GNU/Linux system, this is quite easy, the 
system developer can limit how many 
processes that can be run at the same time. 
This means that no other processes can 
start until another process has been shut 
down. This can be achieved with commands 
such as ulimit  in the GNU/Linux 
environment. Since MeeGo is based on Linux 
it’s a viable solution for our prototype as 
well. A third way of solving this tier is only 
to have specific user-groups for specific 
functionality. For example having a user-
group that is allowed to use the internet 
connection on a platform, and assigning the 
app rights to that user-group, and then 
monitor that group. If the app abuses the 
terms of the user-group it can easily be 
unregistered from that group, not allowing 
it access to that functionality any more.  
TIER 3: CONSTRAINTS ON 
OPERATING SYSTEM 
Sandboxing is a fairly abstract term which 
gathers many techniques used to enhance 
computer security and reliability. Using a 
sandbox is a common way for running 
untrusted software on a system without the 
risk of harming the underlying system. An 
app, or more generically third party 
software, can be considered to be untrusted 
software. Our research started out with 
investigating so called jails, which 
intuitively seemed to be what a sandbox 
was all about. Alternatives to this idea was 
discovered and investigated. 
Examples from the previous section, Tier 2, 
also qualify as examples for this tier, more 
precisely the utilization of mechanisms in 
the Linux kernel and software usually found 
in GNU/Linux distributions. Creating a 
sandbox as part of this tier could mean 
setting up restricted user accounts under 
which processes run and thus have limited 
access to system resources, utilizing the 
Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework 
for mandatory access control (MAC) or 
virtualizing a separate and isolated 
filesystem using a software such as Linux-
VServer.  
The way users are handled in the Linux 
kernel is both a very viable and fairly easy 
mechanism to use for restrictions. Users can 
be allowed permission to different sets of 
system resources and also bundled into 
groups sharing the same permissions. This 
is for example used in the Android security 
model. 
Mandatory Access Control. MAC is for 
instance used in the iPhone iOS sandbox 
where it is based on the TrustedBSD 
framework (Dwivedi et al, 2010). To briefly 
describe MAC, it is a way for the operating 
system to constrain what a program is 
allowed to do with a piece of data or other 
system resource. As presented in the result 
section later in this thesis, MAC can be 
implemented in MeeGo and GNU/Linux 
systems using software which utilizes the 
LSM framework. 
So called jails, which immediately drew our 
attention to the chroot mechanism, is a 
isolated section of a filesystem where a 
piece of software is allowed to execute 
without interaction with the underlying 
system which is thus protected. Chroot in 
itself was however discovered to be a poor 
choice, but alternatives fulfilling the actual 
intention of the jail implementation was 
discovered and is presented in the result 
section. 
This tier also covers the secure execution of 
third-party applications requirement 
described by Desmet et al.(2007) 
METHOD 
RESEARCH SETTING 
A major part of the research effort 
presented in this thesis was executed at the 
infotainment department at CarComp. The 
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intention was to be working in the same 
environment as the architects and 
requirements engineers at CarComp and 
benefit from their knowledge and help. 
MeeGo is a platform based on the Linux 
kernel and is very similar to other 
GNU/Linux distributions, such as Ubuntu 
Linux. The aspects of the MeeGo platform 
this paper discusses, security and reliability, 
can in several ways be taken care of fairly 
easy by embracing standard functionality of 
a GNU/Linux distribution. MeeGo is bundled 
with an IDE based on QT-creator, which 
rapidly increased the setup time needed to 
get everything in order and to start 
developing our solutions.  
To get some perspective of how one can 
solve the execution of apps on a system we 
looked at Android and iPhone. 
In large, Android apps are only as secure as 
the user wants them to be. They rely heavily 
on security permissions that are presented 
to the user when the app is installed on the 
system. If the user accepts that the app will 
have access to a particular system 
functionality, the app will have complete 
access to it. When an app is installed on an 
Android device it is given a specific user id, 
Dwivedi(2010), this allows the app only to 
use functionality from each specific user 
group that it belongs to. The way this is 
done is by having specific user groups for 
different functionality(such as using 
internet connections, or the address book) 
and prompt the user if he or she will allow 
the app to be a part of the specified user 
group. This is not viable in a critical system, 
since the ability or non-ability to make an 
informed decision should not jeopardize the 
system.  
iPhones take on security differs from 
Androids. Apple have the right to 
exclusively control what apps run on their 
system, unless the device is ‘jaibroken’, but 
this is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Apples exclusive domain of what apps are 
available to their system is based on the 
marketing model of their apps, 
Dwivedi(2010). Any developer can develop 
apps for iPhone, but if the app you produce 
violate any of Apples guidelines for apps the 
app will not be available through their 
appstore. All the source code for apps are 
approved by Apple before they are 
published, this kind of security makes it 
hard developers to sneak in security or 
reliability breaches. But it also hinders the 
development of apps, since every app has to 
go through the process of being reviewed. 
This rigid inflexible system that the iPhone 
is using can be viable, based on the 
corporate marketing model of the company 
that wishes to introduce the system. If the 
corporation that is implementing such a 
system does not have the resources to check 
all incoming apps for security breaches and 
unsafe code, it is not practical with such a 
solution.  
It is in this middle-ground that the idea of 
our model was hatched. How can a company 
let third party developers develop apps for 
their critical system without compromising 
that security and reliability, and without 
putting the burden of these requirements 
upon the user. By experimenting with the 
already present concepts of app security on 
the MeeGo platform we managed to raise 
interesting issues to the surface and present 
insights regarding security and reliability 
concerns discovered during the research. 
RESEARCH PROCESS 
This thesis project was executed according 
to the design research methodology 
(Hevner & Chatterjee 2010,). Design 
research was identified as  suitable for a 
couple of reasons, amongst them the fact 
that our research has been dealing with a 
fairly new and unexplored domain. The 
manner in which design research let us 
design, experiment, implement and redo as 
needed was very important in the choice of 
research process. This section will discuss 
the steps in the design research process, 
how each step is related to our research and 
by this justify the choice of methodology. 
Important to keep in mind while reading 
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about these steps is that they were not 
followed exactly or in an as strict manner as 
one might think. Again, it was more the 
experimental nature of design research 
which was appealing rather than the 
proposed structure and order found below. 
Five steps were identified in the design 
cycle (Hevner & Chatterjee 2010,): 
AWARENESS OF PROBLEM 
The automotive industry is pushing their in-
vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems the same 
direction as other mobile platforms in terms 
of functionality. MeeGo is a new platform 
and one of its intentions is to be used as an 
IVI platform. Saab IQon, being based on the 
Android platform, is a great example of the 
emerging IVI field. An interesting problem is 
how third-party software could be handled 
on the MeeGo platform, similarly to the apps 
available for Saab IQon.  
Further, a set of important software 
qualities concerning IVI systems were 
discussed. It became evident that security 
and reliability was of outmost importance. 
The output of this step is intended to be a 
proposal for a new research effort. We 
ended up with the following research 
question: "How can third-party developed 
software be run on MeeGo IVI and respect 
security and reliability concerns?". 
SUGGESTION 
From discussions with an employee at 
CarComp and by looking into existing 
knowledge on the area, an implementation 
of a sandboxing solution was suggested. 
Initially this was a spontaneous suggestion 
which seemed to be appropriate and 
literature confirmed this suggestion, 
Prevelakis & Spinellis(2001), 
McGraw(2004). 
DEVELOPMENT 
During this phase, we developed and 
researched a solution to our identified 
problem. Design is of big importance in this 
step and the goal was not only running code 
on the target platform but also ideas 
regarding architecture and further 
development. This together would 
constitute the model presented and 
discussed throughout this thesis.  
EVALUATION 
During this step, which in this specific 
project ended up to be very much like the 
next and final step, our main contribution to 
the thesis was reached. Collected data, 
assumptions regarding design, deviations 
from our expectations and personal 
reflections was gathered and discussed. 
Design research executed by the book 
would end this step by starting over at the 
suggestion phase with knowledge gained 
throughout the last loop in the design 
research cycle. Due to our narrow time 
frame the next step, reflection, was reached 
immediately after this step. 
REFLECTION 
Loose ends and still unsatisfied 
requirements from our development effort 
was noted and the discussion section of this 
thesis was finished up. Here suggestions for 
future research efforts on our topic was 
identified and presented. These suggestions 
can be found in the end of the discussion 
section.  
DATA COLLECTION AND DATA 
ANALYSIS 
As can be figured out from the example-like 
description of our work process above, 
essentially two categories of data was 
collected: logbook notes and data from the 
evaluation step as described in the design 
research methodology. 
We documented our work progress on a 
daily basis. Each logbook entry was written 
in a structured, pre-defined, format to easily 
let us make use of the notes. Our thoughts 
during the project were important as our 
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perception of the MeeGo platform became 
part of the evaluation process. 
During the research, data in form of 
requirements which can ensure or help a 
system (of the studied kind) to be secure 
and reliable was collected. During analysis 
and also during data collection, 
requirements like this appeared. The key to 
gain such knowledge is through deeper 
insight, which in turn was given by 
interaction with the platform. Interaction in 
this case would mean development for the 
MeeGo platform. This knowledge that was 
analyzed using our theoretical framework 
would specify a model which can help to 
assure security and reliability of the studied 
system, but also systems sharing its 
technical characteristics, such as the fact 
that MeeGo is a GNU/Linux system. 
LIMITATIONS 
A system operating in a car needs to take a 
lot of different technical concerns in to 
consideration, especially from a safety 
perspective. Systems should not be able 
interfere with and cause each other to crash. 
This could have lethal consequences if, for 
instance, a system controlling the breaks all 
of a sudden would crash. 
This project was carried out using hardware 
unattached to a car and nothing of what we 
implement or investigate is taking in to 
account the communication or 
infrastructure of in-vehicle electronics. This 
thesis puts a focus on software engineering 
and hardware aspects could not fit in the 
scope nor time frame of the project. 
It was decided to keep the scope of the 
thesis to third-party software in relation to 
security and reliability. This is not a narrow 
scope, but it will keep the project on track 
while still being as permitting within its 
boundaries as our exploratory research 
would require. 
 
RESULT 
Here we will present the result of the 
development and research effort.  In this 
section, the details of the implementation 
are not discussed in very much depth. If you 
wish to get a deeper understanding of the 
implementation, please see Apendix A for 
the entire source code, including example 
code for an app. 
THREE TIER MODEL IN PRACTICE 
Here we will describe how we implemented 
the three tier model in our proof of concept 
prototype. We will go through each tier like 
the previous section and show how it was 
implemented. 
TIER 1 
In our prototype we took the first approach 
exemplified in the theoretical framework 
section, and implemented a Lua interpreter 
in the code that would run each app. Lua 
(Lua 2011) is a lightweight scripting 
language, written in C, and proved to be 
really useful for this application. And since 
MeeGo IVI is Linux based and the 
implementation language used for our app 
environment was C++, Lua provided us with 
the functionality to not include specific 
libraries that could be harmful to the 
system, such as IO and OS libraries. If such 
functionalities that the IO library provides 
would be needed, we would implement a 
function that would mimic that functionality 
and export it to be used by Lua. But the 
functionality of such a function would be 
controlled by the system, and not by the 
app. This also provided us with the ability to 
build a specific GUI controller for the app, 
which greatly improved the ability to write 
graphical apps. The more non-API functions 
that can be mimicked in the API of the app 
development language, the more secure the 
app environment will become. Since our 
prototype is just a proof-of-concept, we 
decided only to include about 10-15 
functions, such as rendering, image handling 
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and events. Another idea behind this 
approach is the ability to check all the input 
that the app handles and reject input that 
could be harmful for the system. What we 
realized after exporting functions to Lua, 
was that even though we exported a small 
amount of functions we could accomplish 
running apps in MeeGo. The result from this 
tier, proves the idea behind this tier, by 
allowing the developer to write an app that 
can’t be harmful to the system, because of 
the limitations we made to the language. We 
tested this by creating an app that tries to 
use a library that we wouldn’t allow it to 
access. This resulted in the app closing 
down with an appropriate error message. 
TIER 2 
We implemented a controller in to our 
prototype that would spawn each apps 
process and monitor the resources used by 
it. If an app would start using too much 
resources in the form of memory or process 
power the controller would simply close 
down that running app. The implementation 
of the controller was not a really hard task 
to complete because of the way MeeGo IVI is 
built. This made it really easy to spawn 
processes and control them using the native 
Linux implementation of the proc tree. The 
controller was imperative for an app 
running on a critical system, if the system is 
malfunctioning safety and security of the 
user can be at risk. Even a slowdown of such 
a system, for example a process consumes 
too much process power, can put the system 
at risk. Having each app run in its own 
process is a major benefit when working 
with multiprocessing operating systems, 
such as Windows or Linux. It gives stability 
that even if the process somehow crashes or 
freezes, the underlying system is not 
particularly effected, and can continue 
execution. We deemed this necessary 
because of the domain that this system 
would run in, which is a moving car. The 
idea of running each app in a separate 
process is used by other developers such as 
Android. This along with our prototype 
shows that it is a good solution. For 
additional security it’s possible to have 
certain functionality tied to specific user 
groups, Dwivedi(2010) describes the way 
Android have solved this issue, but also 
points out some of the downsides with it, as 
mentioned earlier Android bases a lot of the 
security on the user’s ability to make correct 
assumptions about the software. This was 
something we deemed as a security risk for 
our prototype, and we decided on 
developing the above mentioned interfacing 
with an API instead. Figure 5.1 shows our 
process controller in action. In this instance 
the app called memory hogger used up more 
memory than what was allowed and was 
forced to shut down. This shows what we 
intended for this tier. The app is able to run 
as long as it’s not consuming more memory 
than we allowed it to consume. When the 
memory usage exceeded the threshold set 
for it, the app was closed down and an 
approriate error message was shown. 
 
FIGURE 2 
TIER 3 
On an early stage, we decided to go with a 
mechanism called chroot (‘change root’). 
This mechanism has been around for a long 
time and is a common feature in Unix and 
GNU/Linux systems. A chroot "jail" would 
let us run an app in an isolated section of the 
system and thus prevent it from harming 
the underlying system. However, it was 
discovered that there is really nothing 
preventing a running process from leaving 
the jail and cause damage or other kinds of 
unwanted behavior. Further reading on the 
topic would lead us to dismiss the idea. 
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This statement was backed up by quotes 
from the manual of chroot which states that 
the current working directory (cwd) of the 
process remains the same. Due to this fact, it 
is possible to break out of the jail. Also, the 
fact that only root (UID 0) has the ability to 
use chroot leaves the door to the jail fully 
open in practice. Examples of how this can 
be done is more elaborately shown at the 
homepage of the Linux-VServer project 
(Linux Vserver, 2009,). Our understanding 
is that chroot can be used to create a 
separate section of your system where you 
can run software you do not trust or want to 
test. However, the protection the chroot 
environment offers does not help if the 
software you do not trust knows that it is 
running in a chroot jail and can break out. 
We spent quite some time (a major part of 
the time dedicated for implementation) 
trying to propose a chroot based sandbox on 
MeeGo. Once the problems, or facts, became 
apparent to us, we started to investigate 
related software and other ways in which 
sandboxing could be done.  
Alan Cox mentioned in the same thread on 
kerneltrap that software has been built for 
the purpose of security upon the idea or 
concept of chroot, Linux-VServer and 
FreeBSD Jail are examples. There are more 
alternatives than these. Here we present 
four of them and briefly try to describe their 
purpose and functionality. All are developed 
for Linux systems which makes them 
possible candidates for the MeeGo platform.  
Linux-VServer adds an extra barrier to 
overcome the previously mentioned issues 
with a chroot jail and thus make it more apt 
for a security oriented purpose. This 
software makes it possible to run several, 
separated, virtual servers on one physical 
machine. In the context of this paper, this 
functionality would more or less do the 
exact same thing we intended to do with 
chroot. One virtual server, which is isolated 
from the underlying system would 
constitute the jail.  (Linux Vserver, 2009) 
There are no sources indicating the 
feasibility of using Linux-VServer on MeeGo, 
but in a discussion on a Maemo project (one 
of the predecessors to the MeeGo project) 
forum (Maemo, 2011) it was mentioned as a 
possible candidate for setting up a jail 
environment.  
Another candidate for this section was 
SELinux, but from our understanding based 
on various online discussions, it is perceived 
as hard to use and maintain (Linux 2006). 
An alternative to SELinux suggested on the 
Maemo discussion boards was AppArmor. It 
was only briefly mentioned but caught our 
attention. Apparently, AppArmor is easier to 
use than SELinux, one of the main selling 
points of AppArmor seems to be the ease of 
use (AppArmor 2011). The two differs on a 
fundamentally technical level, but this has 
not been investigated in any closer detail.  
There seems to be no information on the 
possibility of using AppArmor on MeeGo 
and we have not tried this ourselves during 
the project but there is nothing indicating 
that an implementation would be 
impossible. As long as MeeGo is used with a 
kernel version supporting LSM this option is 
interesting.  
Further, we found SMACK and TOMOYO 
Linux. Both are a bit more interesting than 
AppArmor since they seem to have been 
used in practice on the MeeGo platform in 
one way or another. Regarding TOMOYO 
Linux there is not much to say. It is a 
software used for MAC, similar to 
AppArmor. However, a tutorial (Tomoyo 
Linux 2011) on how to run TOMOYO on 
MeeGo was found. This is a life sign and 
TOMOYO might be a suitable tool for MAC 
on MeeGo. We have however not been able 
to try this out in practice during the project. 
Finally, we started to look at SMACK. Edge 
(2010)  reports from a conference for 
lwn.net that SMACK is decided to be the tool 
"chroot is not and never has been 
a security tool" 
(Alan Cox, Kerneltrap  2006).  
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used for access control. This is further 
confirmed in the MeeGo projects wiki page 
on architecture (MeeGo wiki 2011) This 
option seems to be the official choice for 
MAC this far. The author of SMACK,  
Schaufler (2007)  describes his software in 
more depth in his paper.  
CONCLUSION 
The main contribution of this thesis is the 
three tier model, but also the collection of 
thoughts and ideas that arose during the 
development and research processes. The 
model is not the complete solution to the 
problem of app security, but it can at least 
give CarComp, and others who are in the 
process of implementing an app 
environment, some idea of what to consider. 
The suggestion of app environment on the 
MeeGo platform we have proposed 
manifests itself to work in practice and 
theory. Parts of it in mere practice shown by 
our implementation effort, parts in theory 
which led to conclusions based on research. 
The proposed environment is not a 
complete app environment, but it contains, 
along with the presented ideas in this paper, 
a foundation for a body of knowledge which 
could be used to further develop an app 
environment on MeeGo or, as far as we have 
seen, any other GNU/Linux system 
providing the same amount of functionality. 
Because of the way we implemented Lua 
and the way we wrote our app-environment 
the entire system is really lightweight, 
which makes it usable for systems with 
limited resources. And since the apps are 
written in a script language the apps are 
lightweight as well. This is because all the 
heavy GUI implementations are already 
implemented in MeeGo. Furthermore the 
app environment that we produced covers 1 
(secure execution of third-party 
applications),3 (flexible integration of 
enforcement techniques ) and 4 (optimized 
for resource-restricted devices ) of Desmet 
et al.(2007) architectural requirements, 
which we identified as the relevant ones for 
this thesis. So through our research and 
development of our prototype, we can 
conclude that these architectural 
requirements are the important 
requirements in  developing an app-
environment. 
Working with MeeGo was not a challenge in 
itself, since it is based on Linux. Writing 
code and compiling for MeeGo was quite 
straightforward.  
REFLECTION 
The model that we have proposed in this 
thesis works in theory, and in practice in 
our application. This does not mean that it is 
totally fool-proof. Further research into 
each of the tiers focus area is needed for this 
model to provide a really solid framework 
for app-security. 
What we have seen during the study is that 
there are many benefits with MeeGo when it 
comes to security issues. This is likely due to 
the fact that it is based on the Linux kernel. 
As presented in this paper, several tools 
with potential to aid a secure app 
environment on MeeGo exist as generic 
Linux applications. There is also an ongoing 
discussion regarding the various tools in the 
many Linux and security oriented forums, 
mailing lists and blogs. A lot of information 
on the subject remains to be collected and 
analyzed. Our research merely scratched the 
surface.  
As shown in the MeeGo project wiki, access 
control is currently handled using SMACK. 
Time would not allow us to actually try its 
features in practice but it sure feels 
promising that SMACK is a default feature in 
the MeeGo platform. How it can be utilized 
in the design of an app environment 
remains to be seen, but the MAC concept 
taken care of by SMACK is used in other app 
environments, Apple iOS being one. 
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PROPOSITION FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH: 
During the project we came across the 
problem of how software is authenticated 
on the client side after being downloaded. 
Our contact person at CarComp expressed 
the importance of this functionality. Fully 
understanding this issue is not what this 
paper was about and time would not permit 
us to investigate the matter very closely. 
However, making sure that downloaded 
software is what one assumes it to be adds a 
fourth tier of protection to our proposed 
three tiers. It would also be a necessary step 
to take if further development of an app 
environment on the MeeGo platform is 
considered.  
Guaranteeing software authenticity is not 
something new and has been discussed in 
many corners of the internet and by 
researchers. A lot of information is available 
on the topic. Something that came to our 
minds during the research process was that 
existing app environments, like Android 
Market and Apple's App Store share some 
fundamental characteristics with the 
package managers commonly found in 
GNU/Linux distributions (Aptitude, RPM, 
pacman, etc), namely that of distributing 
software. Recently, package managers even 
have nice graphical user interfaces (e.g. 
Ubuntu) and there is a resemblance to the 
app store clients when it comes to usage: 
search, find, download and install. A 
GNU/Linux package manager usually 
handles updates and dependencies between 
packages. Also, last but not least, software 
authentication is more or less handled 
automatically in these package managers. 
To sum this up, our suggestion is that a 
future project our research effort would try 
to utilize a widely used package manager 
such as RPM or Aptitude and build an app 
solution based on it. Exactly what that needs 
to be added has to be figured out for the 
specific case. MeeGo IVI comes shipped with 
RPM installed so perhaps that is a good 
starting point. 
This research effort could potentially 
benefit the free open source software 
(FOSS) community, which has to be 
considered a good thing for the general 
public, if the project would develop or 
modify the existing systems to fit the 
purpose of an app store solution. Further, 
the FOSS community could potentially 
benefit from the existence of such a solution 
as it would enable new ways of using FOSS 
commercially. The problem with making 
money from FOSS has been a common 
criticism but an app store for FOSS 
distribution might just be what could solve 
this problem. The general idea has already 
been adopted by Apple and the Mac App 
Store, which is an appstore for their laptops 
and desktop computers. 
Another suggestion would be to look closer 
to mandatory access control, SMACK in 
particular, and how this can be used to solve 
issues regarding safety and reliability in an 
app environment. A potential study could 
compare different tools for MAC and 
evaluate how suitable they are for various 
kinds of systems. Several options exist and it 
might be of value to industry to read a 
comparison discussion them. Also, this 
could be interesting to the developers of the 
different software projects in order to get 
new ideas which could be used to improve 
their products.  
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APPENDIX A 
Through this URL you can download a zip-file containing all code produced during the project. 
The archive does not include makefiles or anything helping you to compile the code, but this 
should not be too hard to manage if you have some experience with programming.  
 
http://erikks.se/thesis/source.zip 
 
 
 
 
 
